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Abstract
We study the phase transition of the coalitional manipulation problem for generalized scoring rules.
Previously it has been shown that, under some conditions on the distribution of votes, if the number
of manipulators is o (
√
n), where n is the number of voters, then the probability that a random profile
is manipulable by the coalition goes to zero as the number of voters goes to infinity, whereas if the
number of manipulators is ω (
√
n), then the probability that a random profile is manipulable goes to one.
Here we consider the critical window, where a coalition has size c
√
n, and we show that as c goes from
zero to infinity, the limiting probability that a random profile is manipulable goes from zero to one in a
smooth fashion, i.e., there is a smooth phase transition between the two regimes. This result analytically
validates recent empirical results, and suggests that deciding the coalitional manipulation problem may
be of limited computational hardness in practice.
1 Introduction
Finding “good” voting systems which satisfy some natural requirements is one of the main goals in social
choice theory. This problem is increasingly relevant in the area of artificial intelligence and in computer
science more broadly, where virtual elections are now an established tool for preference aggregation (see,
e.g., [6]).
A naturally desirable property of a voting system is strategyproofness (a.k.a. nonmanipulability): no
voter should benefit from voting strategically, i.e., voting not according to her true preferences. However,
Gibbard [17] and Satterthwaite [30] showed that no reasonable voting system can be strategyproof. Before
stating their result, let us specify the problem more formally.
We consider n voters electing a single winner among m candidates. The voters specify their opinion by
ranking the candidates, and the winner is determined according to some predefined social choice function
(SCF) f : Snm → [m] of all the voters’ rankings, where Sm denotes the set of all possible total orderings
of the m candidates. We call a collection of rankings by the voters a ranking profile. We say that a SCF
is manipulable if there exists a ranking profile where a voter can achieve a more desirable outcome of the
election according to her true preferences by voting in a way that does not reflect her true preferences.
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that any SCF which is not a dictatorship (i.e., not a function of
a single voter), and which allows at least three candidates to be elected, is manipulable. This has contributed
to the realization that it is unlikely to expect truthfulness in voting. Consequently, there have been many
branches of research devoted to understanding the extent of the manipulability of voting systems, and to
finding ways of circumventing the negative results.
One approach, introduced by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [3], suggests computational complexity as a
barrier against manipulation: a SCF may not be manipulable in practice if it is hard for a voter to compute
a manipulative vote. A significant body of work focuses on the worst-case complexity of manipulation
(see the survey by Faliszewski and Procaccia [13]). Here we are interested specifically in the coalitional
manipulation problem, where a group of voters can change their votes in unison, with the goal of making
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a given candidate win. Various variations of this problem are known to be NP-hard under many of the
common SCFs [10, 39, 4].
Crucially, this line of work focuses on worst-case complexity. While worst-case hardness of manipulation
is a desirable property for a SCF to have, it does not tell us much about typical instances of the problem—is
it usually easy or hard to manipulate? A recent line of research on average-case manipulability has been
questioning the validity of such worst-case complexity results. The goal of this alternative line of work is to
show that there are no “reasonable” voting rules that are computationally hard to manipulate on average.
Specifically, the goal is to rule out the following informal statement: there are “good” voting rules that are
hard to manipulate on average under any “sufficiently rich” distribution over votes.
Taking this point of view, showing easiness of manipulation under a restricted class of distributions—such
as i.i.d. votes or even uniform votes (the impartial culture assumption)—is interesting, even if these do not
necessarily capture all possible real-world elections. Specifically, if we show that manipulation is easy under
such distributions, then any average-case hardness result would necessarily have to make some unnatural
technical assumptions to avoid these distributions. Studying such restricted distributions over votes is indeed
exactly what some recent papers have done.
For the coalitional manipulation problem, Procaccia and Rosenschein [28] first suggested that it is trivial
to determine whether manipulation is possible for most coalitional manipulation instances, from a typical-
case computational point of view; one can make a highly informed guess purely based on the number of
manipulators. Specifically, they studied a setting where there is a distribution over votes (which satisfies
some conditions), and concentrated on a family of SCFs known as positional scoring rules. They showed
that if the size of the coalition is o (
√
n), then with probability converging to 1 as n → ∞, the coalition
is powerless, i.e., it cannot change the outcome of the election. In contrast, if the size of the coalition is
ω (
√
n) (and o (n)), then with probability converging to 1 as n→∞, the coalition is all-powerful, i.e., it can
elect any candidate. Later Xia and Conitzer [37] proved an analogous result for so-called generalized scoring
rules, a family that contains almost all common voting rules. See also related work by Peleg [25], Slinko [31],
Pritchard and Slinko [26], and Pritchard and Wilson [27]. We discuss additional related work in Section 1.2.
Our primary interest in this paper is to understand the critical window that these papers leave open, when
the size of the coalition is Θ (
√
n). Specifically, we are interested in the phase transition in the probability
of coalitional manipulation, when the size of the coalition is c
√
n and c varies from zero to infinity, i.e., the
transition from powerlessness to absolute power.
In the past few decades there has been much research on the connection between phase transitions and
computationally hard problems (see, e.g., [16, 8, 2]). In particular, it is often the case that the computa-
tionally hardest problems can be found at critical values of a sharp phase transition (see, e.g., [18] for an
overview). On the other hand, smooth phase transitions are often found in connection with computation-
ally easy (polynomial) problems, such as 2-coloring [1] and 1-in-2 SAT [32]. Thus understanding the phase
transition in this critical window may shed light on where the computationally hardest problems lie.
Recently, Walsh [33] empirically analyzed two well-known voting rules—veto and single transferable vote
(STV)—and found that there is a smooth phase transition between the two regimes. Specifically, Walsh
studied coalitional manipulation with unweighted votes for STV and weighted votes for veto, and sampled
from a number of distributions in his experiments, including i.i.d. distributions, correlated distributions, and
votes sampled from real-world elections. Our main result complements and improves upon Walsh’s analysis
in two ways; while Walsh’s results show how the phase transition looks like concretely for veto and STV, we
analytically show that the phase transition is indeed smooth for any generalized scoring rule (including veto
and STV) when the votes are i.i.d. This suggests that deciding the coalitional manipulation problem may
not be computationally hard in practice.
1.1 Our results
We now present our results, but first let us formally specify the setup of the problem. We denote a ranking
profile by σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) ∈ Snm, and for a candidate a, define Wa = {σ ∈ Snm | f (σ) = a}, the set of ranking
profiles where the outcome of f is a. Our setup and assumptions are the following.
Assumption 1. We assume that the number of candidates, m, is constant.
Assumption 2. We assume that the SCF f is anonymous, i.e., it treats each voter equally.
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Assumption 3. We assume that the votes of voters are i.i.d., according to some distribution p on Sm.
Furthermore, we assume that there exists δ > 0 such that for every π ∈ Sm, p (π) ≥ δ (necessarily δ ≤ 1/m!).
If we were to assume only these, then our setup would include uninteresting cases, such as when f is a
constant—i.e., no matter what the votes are, a specific candidate wins. Another less interesting case is when
the probability of a given candidate winning vanishes as n→ ∞—we can then essentially forget about this
candidate for large n (in the sense that a coalition of size Ω (n) would be necessary to make this candidate
win). To exclude these and focus on the interesting cases, we make an additional assumption which concerns
both the SCF and the distribution of votes.
Assumption 4. We assume that there exists ε > 0 such that for every n and for every candidate a ∈ [m],
the probability of a being elected is at least ε > 0, i.e., P (Wa) ≥ ε (necessarily ε ≤ 1/m).
All four assumptions are satisfied when the distribution is uniform (i.e., under the impartial culture
assumption) and the SCF is close to being neutral (i.e., neutral up to some tie-breaking rules); in particular,
they hold for all commonly used SCFs. The assumptions are somewhat more general than this, although
the i.i.d. assumption remains a restrictive one. However, as discussed earlier, even showing easiness of
manipulation under such a restricted class of distributions is interesting.
As mentioned before, we are interested in the case when the coalition has size c
√
n for some constant c.
Define the probabilities
q
n
(c) := P
(
some coalition of size c
√
n can elect any candidate
)
,
qn (c) := P
(
some coalition of size c
√
n can change the outcome of the election
)
,
rn (c) := P
(
a specific coalition of size c
√
n can elect any candidate
)
,
rn (c) := P
(
a specific coalition of size c
√
n can change the outcome of the election
)
,
and let
q (c) := lim
n→∞
q
n
(c) , q (c) := lim
n→∞
qn (c) , r (c) := lim
n→∞
rn (c) , r (c) := limn→∞
rn (c) ,
provided these limits exist. Clearly q
n
(c) ≤ qn (c), rn (c) ≤ rn (c), rn (c) ≤ qn (c), and rn (c) ≤ qn (c).
Before we describe our results, which deal with these quantities, we first explain how these relate to
the various variants of the coalitional manipulation problem. In the coalitional manipulation problem the
coalition is fixed, and thus the relevant quantities are rn (c) and rn (c). Closely related is the problem of
determining the margin of victory, which is the minimum number of voters who need to change their votes
to change the outcome of the election. Also related is the problem of bribery, the minimum number of voters
who need to change their votes to make a given candidate win. The main difference between these problems
is that in coalitional manipulation the coalition is fixed, whereas in the latter two problems the coalition
is not fixed. Hence the relevant quantities for studying the latter two are q
n
(c) and qn (c). Our tools also
allow us to deal with other related quantities (such as microbribery [12]), but we focus our attention on the
four quantities described above.
Our first result analyzes the case when the size of the coalition is c
√
n for large c. We show that if c is
large enough, then with probability close to 1, a specific coalition of size c
√
n can elect any candidate. This
holds for any SCF that satisfies the above (mild) restrictions.
Theorem 1.1. Assume that Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4 hold. For any η > 0 there exists a constant
c = c (η, δ, ε,m) such that rn (c) ≥ 1− η for every n. In particular, we can choose
c = (4/δ) log (2m!/η)
[√
log (2m/η) +
√
log (2/ε)
]
.
It follows that
lim
c→∞
lim inf
n
rn (c) = 1.
This result extends theorems of Procaccia and Rosenschein [28], and Xia and Conitzer [37], from scoring
rules and generalized scoring rules, respectively, to anonymous SCFs.
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Our second result deals with the case when the size of the coalition is c
√
n for small c, and the transition
as c goes from 0 to ∞. Here we assume additionally that f is a generalized scoring rule (to be defined in
Section 3.1.1); this is needed because there exist (pathological) anonymous SCFs for which the result below
does not hold (see the beginning of Section 3 for an example).
Theorem 1.2. Assume that Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4 hold, and furthermore that f is a generalized scoring
rule. Then:
(1) The limits q (c), q (c), r (c) and r (c) exist.
(2) There exists a constant K = K (f, δ) <∞ such that q (c) ≤ Kc; in particular, limc→0 q (c) = 0.
(3) For all 0 < c <∞, 0 < q (c) ≤ q (c) < 1 and 0 < r (c) ≤ r (c) < 1, and furthermore q (c), q (c), r (c) and
r (c) are all continuously differentiable in c with bounded derivative.
In words, Part 2 means that if c is small enough then with probability close to 1 no coalition of size
c
√
n can change the outcome of the election, and the statements about r and r in Part 3 mean that the
coalitional manipulation problem has a smooth phase transition: as the number of manipulators increases,
the probabilities that a coalition has some power, and that it has absolute power, increase smoothly. Parts 1
and 2 of the theorem simply make a result of Xia and Conitzer [37] more precise, by extending the analysis to
the Θ(
√
n) regime. More importantly, in the proofs of these statements we introduce the machinery needed
to establish Part 3, which is our main result.
Since the coalitional manipulation problem does not have a sharp phase transition, Theorem 1.2 can be
interpreted as suggesting that realistic distributions over votes are likely to yield coalitional manipulation
instances that are tractable in practice, even if the size of the coalition concentrates on the previously
elusive Θ(
√
n) regime; this is true for any generalized scoring rule, and in particular for almost all common
social choice functions (an exception is Dodgson’s rule). This interpretation has a negative flavor in further
strengthening the conclusion that worst-case complexity is a poor barrier to manipulation.
However, the complexity glass is in fact only half empty. The probability that the margin of victory is at
most c
√
n is captured by the quantity qn, hence Part 3 of Theorem 1.2 also implies that the margin of victory
problem has a smooth phase transition. As recently pointed out by Xia [34], efficiently solving the margin
of victory problem could help in post-election audits—used to determine whether electronic elections have
resulted in an incorrect outcome due to software or hardware bugs—and its tractability is in fact desirable.
The methods we use are flexible, and can be extended to various setups of interest that do not directly
satisfy our assumptions above, for instance single-peaked preferences. Consider a one-dimensional political
spectrum represented by the interval [0, 1], and fix the location of the candidates. Assume voters are
uniformly distributed on the interval, independently of each other. For technical reasons, this distribution
does not satisfy our assumptions, since there will be rankings π ∈ Sm such that p (π) = 0; however, our
tools allow us to deal with this setting as well. For instance, if the locations of the m candidates are{
1
2m ,
3
2m , . . . ,
2m−1
2m
}
, then our results hold (with appropriate quantitative modifications). Similarly, if the
locations were something else, then there would exist a subset of candidates who have an asymptotically
nonvanishing probability of winning, and the same results hold restricted to this subset of candidates.
Finally, we discuss the role of tie-breaking in our setup, since this is often an important issue when
studying manipulation. However, since we consider manipulation by coalitions of size c
√
n, ties where there
exist a constant number of voters such that if their votes are changed appropriately there is no longer a
tie, are not relevant. Indeed, our tools allow us to extend the results of Theorem 1.2 to a class of SCFs
slightly beyond generalized scoring rules, and, in particular, these allow for arbitrary tie-breaking rules (see
Section 3.2.1 for details).
1.2 Additional related work
A recent line of research with an average-case algorithmic flavor also suggests that manipulation is indeed
typically easy; see, e.g., the work of Kelly [21], Conitzer and Sandholm [9], Procaccia and Rosenschein [29],
and Zuckerman et al. [41] for results on certain restricted classes of SCFs. A different approach, initiated
by Friedgut, Kalai, Keller and Nisan [15, 14], who studied the fraction of ranking profiles that are manipu-
lable, also suggests that manipulation is easy on average; see further Xia and Conitzer [36], Dobzinski and
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Procaccia [11], Isaksson, Kindler and Mossel [20], and Mossel and Ra´cz [23]. We refer to the survey by
Faliszewski and Procaccia [13] for a detailed history of the surrounding literature. See also related literature
in economics, e.g., [19, 7, 24].
Recent work by Xia [34] is independent from, and closely related to, our work. As mentioned above,
Xia’s paper is concerned with computing the margin of victory in elections. He focuses on computational
complexity questions and approximation algorithms, but one of his results is similar to Parts 1 and 2 of
Theorem 1.2. However, our analysis is completely different; our approach facilitates the proof of Part 3 of
the theorem, which is our main contribution. An even more recent (and also independent) manuscript by
Xia [35] considers similar questions for generalized scoring rules and captures additional types of strategic
behavior (such as control), but again, crucially, this work does not attempt to understand the phase transition
(nor does it subsume our Theorem 1.1).
2 Large coalitions
Without further ado, we prove Theorem 1.1. The main idea is to observe that for i.i.d. distributions, the
Hamming distance of a random ranking profile from a fixed subset of ranking profiles concentrates around
its mean. The theorem follows from standard concentration inequalities.
Proof of Theorem 1.1. For σ, σ′ ∈ Snm, define
d (σ, σ′) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1 [σi 6= σ′i] ,
i.e., d (σ, σ′) is 1/n times the Hamming distance of σ and σ′. If U is a subset of ranking profiles and σ is
a specific ranking profile then define dU (σ) = minσ′∈U d (σ, σ′). The function dU is Lipschitz with constant
1/n, and therefore by McDiarmid’s inequality we have the following concentration inequality:
(1) P (|dU (σ)− EdU | ≥ c) ≤ 2 exp
(−2c2n)
for any c > 0 and U ⊆ Snm. Suppose U ⊆ Snm has measure at least ε, i.e., U is such that P (σ ∈ U) ≥ ε, and
take γ such that 2 exp
(−2γ2n) < ε, e.g., let γ =√log (2/ε)/√n. Then (1) implies that there exists σ ∈ U
such that |dU (σ)− EdU | ≤ γ, but since dU (σ) = 0, this means that EdU ≤ γ. So for such a set U , we have
P (dU (σ) > γ + c) ≤ exp
(−2c2n)
for any c > 0. Choosing c = B/
√
n and defining B′ = B +
√
log (2/ε) we get that
(2) P
(
dU (σ) > B
′/
√
n
) ≤ exp (−2B2) .
In the language of the usual Hamming distance, this means that the probability that the ranking profile
needs to be changed in at least B′
√
n coordinates to be in U is at most exp
(−2B2), which can be made
arbitrarily small by choosing B large enough.
By our assumption, P (σ ∈ Wa) ≥ ε for every a, and therefore by (2) and a union bound we get
P
(∃a : dWa (σ) > B′/√n) ≤ m exp (−2B2) .
By choosing B =
√
log (2m/η), this probability is at most η/2.
Consider a specific coalition of size DB′
√
n, where D = D (δ,m) will be chosen later. Using Chernoff’s
bound and a union bound, with probability close to one, for every possible ranking π the coalition has at
least B′
√
n voters with the ranking π:
P
(∃π ∈ Sm : coalition of size DB′√n has less than B′√n voters with ranking π)
≤ m!P (Bin (DB′√n, δ) < B′√n) ≤ m! exp(− (1− 1/Dδ)2DB′√nδ/2)
≤ m! exp
(
− (1− 1/Dδ)2Dδ/2
)
,
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where Bin (DB′
√
n, δ) denotes a binomial random variable with parameters DB′
√
n and δ, and where we
used our assumption that for every voter the probability for every ranking is at least δ > 0. Choosing
D = (4/δ) log (2m!/η), this probability is at most η/2.
By the anonymity of f , the outcome only depends on the number of voters voting according to each
ranking. Consequently, if σ is such that it is at a distance of at most B′/
√
n away from each Wa, and where
for each ranking π there are at least B′
√
n voters in the coalition with ranking π, then the coalition is able to
achieve any outcome. Using the above and a union bound this happens with probability at least 1− η.
3 Small coalitions and the phase transition
This section is almost entirely devoted to the proof of Theorem 1.2, but it also includes some helpful
definitions, examples, and intuitions.
Consider the following example of a SCF. For a ∈ [m] let na (σ) denote the number of voters who ranked
candidate a on top in the ranking profile σ. Define the SCF f by f (σ) =
∑m
a=1 ana (σ) mod m. This SCF
is clearly anonymous (since it only depends on the number of voters voting according to specific rankings),
and moreover it is easy to see that any single voter can always elect any candidate.
This example shows that, in general, we cannot have a matching lower bound for the size of the manip-
ulating coalition on the order of
√
n. However, this is an artificial example (one would not consider such a
voting system in real life), and we expect that a matching lower bound holds for most reasonable SCFs.
Xia and Conitzer [37] introduced a large class of SCFs called generalized scoring rules, which include
most commonly occurring SCFs. In the following we introduce this class of SCFs, provide an alternative
way of looking at them (as so-called “hyperplane rules”), and show that for this class of SCFs if the coalition
has size c
√
n for small enough c, then the probability of being able to change the outcome of the election
can be arbitrarily close to zero. At the end of the section we then prove the smooth transition as stated in
Part 3 of Theorem 1.2.
3.1 Generalized scoring rules, hyperplane rules, and their equivalence
3.1.1 Generalized scoring rules
We now define generalized scoring rules.
Definition 1. For any y, z ∈ Rk, we say that y and z are equivalent, denoted by y ∼ z, if for every i, j ∈ [k],
yi ≥ yj if and only if zi ≥ zj.
Definition 2. A function g : Rk → [m] is compatible if for any y ∼ z, g (y) = g (z).
That is, for any function g that is compatible, g (y) is completely determined by the total preorder of
{y1, . . . , yk} (a total preorder is an ordering in which ties are allowed).
Definition 3 (Generalized scoring rules). Let k ∈ N, f : Sm → Rk (called a generalized scoring function),
and g : Rk → [m] where g is compatible (g is called a decision function). The functions f and g determine
the generalized scoring rule GS (f, g) as follows: for σ ∈ Snm, let
GS (f, g) (σ) := g
(
n∑
i=1
f (σi)
)
.
From the definition it is clear that every generalized scoring rule (GSR) is anonymous.
3.1.2 Hyperplane rules
Preliminaries and notation. In the following, for a SCF let us write f ≡ fn, i.e., let us explicitly note
that f is a function on n voters; also let us write σ ≡ σn. Since the SCF fn is anonymous, the outcome
only depends on the numbers of voters who vote according to particular rankings. Let Dn denote the set of
points in the probability simplex ∆m! for which all coordinates are integer multiples of 1/n. Let us denote
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a typical element of the probability simplex ∆m! by x = {xπ}π∈Sm . For a ranking profile σn, let us denote
the corresponding element of the probability simplex by x (σn), i.e., for all π ∈ Sm,
x (σn)π =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1 [σi = π] .
By our assumptions the outcome of fn only depends on x (σ
n), so by abuse of notation we may write that
fn : ∆
m!|Dn → [m] with fn (σn) = fn (x (σn)).
We are now ready to define hyperplane rules.
Definition 4 (Hyperplane rules). Fix a finite set of affine hyperplanes of the simplex ∆m!: H1, . . . , Hℓ. Each
affine hyperplane partitions the simplex into three parts: the affine hyperplane itself and two open halfspaces
on either side of the affine hyperplane. Thus the affine hyperplanes H1, . . . , Hℓ partition the simplex into
finitely many (at most 3ℓ) regions. Let F : ∆m! → [m] be a function which is constant on each such region.
Then the sequence of SCFs {fn}n≥1, fn : Snm → [m], defined by
fn (σ
n) = F (x (σn))
is called a hyperplane rule induced by the affine hyperplanes H1, . . . , Hℓ and the function F .
A function F : ∆m! → [m] naturally partitions the simplex ∆m! into m parts based on the outcome of F .
(For hyperplane rules this partition is coarser than the partition of ∆m! induced by the affine hyperplanes
H1, . . . , Hℓ.) We abuse notation and denote these parts by {Wa}a∈[m]. The following definition will be useful
for us.
Definition 5 (Interior and boundaries of a partition induced by F ). We say that x ∈ ∆m! is an interior
point of the partition {Wa}a∈[m] induced by F if there exists α > 0 such that for all y ∈ ∆m! for which
|x− y| ≤ α, we have F (x) = F (y). Otherwise, we say that x ∈ ∆m! is on the boundary of the partition,
which we denote by B.
For a hyperplane rule the boundary B is contained in the union of the corresponding affine hyperplanes.
Conversely, suppose F : ∆m! → [m] is an arbitrary function and the sequence of (anonymous) SCFs {fn}n≥1,
fn : S
n
m → [m] is defined by fn (σn) = F (x (σn)). If the boundary B of F is contained in the union of finitely
many affine hyperplanes of ∆m!, then F is not necessarily a hyperplane rule, but there exists a hyperplane rule
Fˆ such that F and Fˆ agree everywhere except perhaps on the union of the finitely many affine hyperplanes.
3.1.3 Equivalence
Xia and Conitzer [38] gave a characterization of generalized scoring rules: a SCF is a generalized scoring rule
if and only if it is anonymous and finitely locally consistent (see Xia and Conitzer [38, Definition 5]). This
characterization is related to saying that generalized scoring rules are the same as hyperplane rules, yet we
believe that spelling this out explicitly is important, because the geometric viewpoint of hyperplane rules is
somewhat different, and in this probabilistic context it is also more flexible.
Lemma 3.1. The class of generalized scoring rules coincides with the class of hyperplane rules.
Proof. First let us show that every hyperplane rule is a generalized scoring rule. Let us consider the hyper-
plane rule induced by affine hyperplanes H1, . . . , Hℓ of the simplex ∆
m!, and the function F : ∆m! → [m].
The affine hyperplanes of ∆m! can be thought of as hyperplanes of Rm! that go through the origin—abusing
notation we also denote these by H1, . . . , Hℓ. Let u1, . . . , uℓ denote unit normal vectors of these hyperplanes.
We need to define functions f and g such that for every ranking profile σn ∈ Snm, GS (f, g) (σn) =
F (x (σn)). We will have f : Sm → Rℓ+1 and g : Rℓ+1 → [m]. Coordinates 1, . . . , ℓ of f correspond to
hyperplanes H1, . . . , Hℓ, while the last coordinate of f will always be 0 (this is a technical necessity to make
sure that the function g is compatible). Let us look at the coordinate corresponding to hyperplane Hj with
normal vector uj. For π ∈ Sm define
(f (π))j ≡ (f (π))Hj ≡ (f (π))uj := (uj)π ,
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where the coordinates of Rm! are indexed by elements of Sm. Then
(f (σn))j :=
n∑
i=1
(f (σi))j =
n∑
i=1
(uj)σi = n (uj · x (σn)) .
The sign of (f (σn))j thus tells us which side of the hyperplane Hj the point x (σ
n) lies on. We define g (y)
for all y ∈ Rℓ+1 such that yℓ+1 = 0; then the requirement that g be compatible defines g for all y ∈ Rℓ+1.
For x ∈ R, define sgn (x) to be 1 if x > 0, −1 if x < 0, and 0 if x = 0.
To define g (y1, . . . , yℓ, 0), look at the vector (sgn (y1) , . . . , sgn (yℓ)). This vector determines a region
in ∆m! in the following way: if sgn (yj) = 1, then the region lies in the same open halfspace as uj , if
sgn (yj) = −1 then the region lies in the open halfspace which does not contain uj , and finally if yj =
0, then the region lies in the hyperplane Hj . Now we define g (y1, . . . , yℓ, 0) to be the value of F on
the region of ∆m! defined by (sgn (y1) , . . . , sgn (yℓ)). The value of g (y1, . . . , yℓ, 0) is well-defined since F
is constant in each such region. Moreover, if we take y ∼ z with yℓ+1 = zℓ+1 = 0, then necessarily
(sgn (y1) , . . . , sgn (yℓ)) = (sgn (z1) , . . . , sgn (zℓ)), and thus g (y) = g (z): so g is compatible (this is where
we used the extra coordinate).
Now let us show that every generalized scoring rule is a hyperplane rule. Suppose a generalized scoring
rule is given by functions f : Sm → Rk and g : Rk → [m]. For a ranking profile σn ∈ Snm, define
f (σn) :=
∑n
i=1 f (σi) = n
∑
π∈Sm f (π) (x (σ
n))π; in this way we can view f as a function mapping N
m!
≥0 \ {0}
to Rk (and hence can also view GS (f, g) as a function mapping Nm!≥0 \ {0} to [m]). Since this mapping is
homogeneous, we may extend the domain of f (and hence that of GS (f, g)) to Qm!≥0 \ {0} in the natural way.
For a total preorderO, let RO =
{
x ∈ Qm!≥0 \ {0} : f (x) ∼ O
}
. By definition, if x, y ∈ RO then g (f (x)) =
g (f (y)), i.e., GS (f, g) is constant in each region RO. Each region RO is a Q-convex cone, i.e. if x, y ∈ RO
and λ ∈ Q∩ [0, 1], then λx + (1− λ) y ∈ RO, and furthermore if µ ∈ Q>0, then µx ∈ RO (both of these
properties follow immediately from Definition 1). Thus we can write Qm!≥0 \ {0} as the disjoint union of the
Q-convex cones {RO}O. The only way to do this is by taking finitely many hyperplanes of Rm! and cutting
Qm!≥0 \ {0} using these hyperplanes; a precise statement of this can be found in Appendix A. This essentially
follows from a result by Kemperman [22, Theorem 2]—to keep the paper self-contained we reproduce in
Appendix A his results and proof, and show how the statement above follows from his results. Since our
function is homogeneous, we need only look at the values of GS (f, g) on the simplex ∆m!. By the above,
the simplex is divided into regions
{
RO ∩∆m!
}
O via affine hyperplanes of ∆
m!, and the function GS (f, g)
is constant on RO ∩∆m! for each total preorder O, so GS (f, g) is indeed a hyperplane rule.
3.1.4 Examples
Most commonly used SCFs are generalized scoring rules / hyperplane rules, including all positional scoring
rules, instant-runoff voting, Coombs’ method, contingent vote, the Keme´ny-Young method, Bucklin voting,
Nanson’s method, Baldwin’s method, Copeland’s method, maximin, and ranked pairs. Some of these exam-
ples were already shown by Xia and Conitzer [37, 38], but nevertheless in Appendix B we detail explanations
of many of these examples. The main reason for this is that the perspective of a hyperplane rule arguably
makes these explanations simpler and clearer. A rule that does not fit into this framework is Dodgson’s rule,
which is not homogeneous (see, e.g., [5]), and therefore it is not a hyperplane rule.
3.2 Small coalitions for generalized scoring rules
We now show that for generalized scoring rules, a coalition of size c
√
n for small enough c can only change
the outcome of the election with small probability. By the equivalence above, we can work in the framework
of hyperplane rules.
We consider two metrics on ∆m!: the L1 metric, denoted by d1 or ‖·‖1, and the L2 metric, denoted by d2
or ‖·‖2. The L1 metric is important in this setting, since changing the votes of voters corresponds to moving
in the L1 metric on ∆m!; this connection is formalized in the following lemma.
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Lemma 3.2. Let σn, τn ∈ Snm. Then d1 (x (σn) , x (τn)) ≤ 2ndH (σn, τn), where dH denotes Hamming
distance, i.e., dH (σ
n, τn) =
∑n
i=1 1 [σi 6= τi]. Furthermore, if y ∈ Dn, then there exists τˆn ∈ Snm such that
x (τˆn) = y and d1 (x (σ
n) , y) = 2ndH (σ
n, τˆn).
Proof. Let π0 = σn, and for i = 1, . . . , n, define the ranking profile πi as πi = (τ1, . . . , τi, σi+1, . . . , σn). By
definition, πn = τn. The desired inequality then follows from the triangle inequality:
d1 (x (σ
n) , x (τn)) = d1
(
x
(
π0
)
, x (πn)
) ≤ n∑
i=1
d1
(
x
(
πi−1
)
, x
(
πi
))
=
n∑
i=1
2
n
1 [σi 6= τi] = 2
n
dH (σ
n, τn) .
For the second part of the lemma, construct τˆn as follows. For each π ∈ Sm, let Iπ := {i ∈ [n] : σi = π}. If
x (σn)π ≤ yπ, then for every i ∈ Iπ , let τˆi = π. If x (σn)π > yπ, then choose a subset of indices I ′π ⊂ Iπ
of size |I ′π| = nyπ, and for every i ∈ I ′π , let τˆi = π. Finally, define the rest of the coordinates of τˆn so that
x (τˆn) = y. The construction guarantees that then d1 (x (σ
n) , y) = 2ndH (σ
n, τˆn).
It is therefore natural to define distances from the boundary B using the L1 metric:
Definition 6 (Blowup of boundary). For α > 0, we define the blowup of the boundary B by α to be
B+α =
{
y ∈ ∆m! : ∃x ∈ B such that ‖x− y‖1 ≤ α
}
.
In order for some coalition to be able to change the outcome of the election at a given ranking profile, the
point on the simplex corresponding to this ranking profile needs to be sufficiently close to the boundary B;
this is formulated in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3. Suppose we have n voters, a coalition of size k, and the ranking profile is σn ∈ Snm, which
corresponds to the point x (σn) ∈ ∆m! on the probability simplex. A necessary condition for the coalition
to be able to change the outcome of the election from this position is that x (σn) ∈ B+2k/n. Conversely, if
x (σn) ∈ B+(2k−m!)/n, then there exists a coalition of size k that can change the outcome of the election.
Proof. For any ranking profile τn that the coalition can reach, we have dH (σ
n, τn) ≤ k, and so by Lemma 3.2
we have d1 (x (σ
n) , x (τn)) ≤ 2kn . If x (σn) /∈ B+2k/n, then for every ranking profile τn which the coalition can
reach, x (σn) and x (τn) are in the same region determined by the hyperplanes, and so F (x (τn)) = F (x (σn)),
i.e., the coalition cannot change the outcome of the election.
Now suppose that x (σn) ∈ B+(2k−m!)/n. Then there exists y ∈ B such that d1 (x (σn) , y) ≤ 2k−m!n .
Since y ∈ B, there exists yˆ ∈ Dn such that d1 (y, yˆ) ≤ m!n and F (yˆ) 6= F (x (σn)). By the triangle inequality,
d1 (x (σ
n) , yˆ) ≤ 2kn , and then by the second part of Lemma 3.2 there exists τˆn ∈ Snm such that x (τˆn) = yˆ and
dH (σ
n, τˆn) ≤ k. The coalition consisting of voters with indices in I := {i ∈ [n] : σi 6= τˆi} can thus change
the outcome of the election.
Corollary 3.4. If we have n voters, the probability that some coalition of size k can change the outcome
of the election is bounded from below by P
(
x (σn) ∈ B+(2k−m!)/n) and from above by P (x (σn) ∈ B+2k/n),
where σn is drawn according to the probability distribution satisfying the conditions of the setup.
Gaussian limit. Due to the i.i.d.-ness of the votes, the multinomial random variable x (σn) concentrates
around its expectation, and the rescaled random variable
x˜ (σn) :=
√
n (x (σn)− E (x (σn)))
converges to a normal distribution, with zero mean and specific covariance structure. For our analysis it is
better to use this Gaussian picture, and thus we will reformulate the preliminaries above in this limiting
setting. First, let us determine the limiting distribution.
Lemma 3.5. We have x˜ (σn) ⇒n N (0,Σ), where the covariance structure is given by Σ = diag (p)− ppT ,
where recall that p is the distribution of a vote.
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Proof. It is clear that E (x˜ (σn)) = 0. Computing the covariance structure, we first have that E
(
x2π
)
=
1
n2
∑n
i,j=1 P (σi = π, σj = π) =
(
1− 1n
)
p (π)
2
+ 1np (π), from which we have Var (xπ) =
1
n
(
p (π)− p (π)2
)
and
thus Var (x˜π) = p (π)−p (π)2. Then similarly for π 6= π′ we have E (xπxπ′) = 1n2
∑n
i,j=1 P (σi = π, σj = π
′) =
1
n2
∑
i6=j p (π) p (π
′) =
(
1− 1n
)
p (π) p (π′), from which we have that Cov (xπ, xπ′) = − 1np (π) p (π′) and thus
Cov (x˜π , x˜π′) = −p (π) p (π′).
Note: because of the concentration of x (σn) around its mean, and our assumption that for every n and
for every candidate a ∈ [m], P (f (σn) = a) ≥ ε, it is necessary that for every α > 0 and for every candidate
a ∈ [m] there exists y ∈ ∆m! such that ‖y − E (x (σ1))‖1 ≤ α and F (y) = a.
Denote by µ the distribution of N (0,Σ) and let X˜ denote a random variable distributed according to
µ. Note that µ is a degenerate multivariate normal distribution, as the support of µ concentrates on the
hyperplane H0 where the coordinates sum to zero. (This is because
∑
π∈Sm x˜ (σ
n)π = 0.)
The underlying function F : ∆m! → [m] corresponds to a function F˜ : Rm! |H0 → [m] in the Gaussian
limit, and this function F˜ partitions Rm! |H0 into m parts based on the outcome of F˜ . We denote these
parts by
{
W˜a
}
a∈[m]
. We will need the following definitions and properties of boundaries, analogous to those
above.
Definition 7 (Interior and boundaries of a partition). We say that x˜ ∈ Rm! |H0 is an interior point of the
partition
{
W˜a
}
a∈[m]
induced by F˜ if there exists α > 0 such that for all y˜ ∈ Rm! |H0 for which ‖x˜− y˜‖1 ≤ α,
we have F˜ (x˜) = F˜ (y˜). Otherwise, we say that x˜ ∈ Rm! |H0 is on the boundary of the partition, which we
denote by B˜.
Lemma 3.6. If the boundary B comes from a hyperplane rule, i.e., B is contained in the union of ℓ affine
hyperplanes in ∆m!, then B˜ is contained in the union of ℓ˜ hyperplanes of Rm! |H0 , where ℓ˜ ≤ ℓ.
Proof. Two things can happen to an affine hyperplane H of ∆m! when we take the Gaussian limit: (1) if
E (x (π)) ∈ H , then translation by E (x (π)) takes H into a hyperplane H˜ of Rm! |H0 , and since H˜ goes
through the origin, scaling (in particular by
√
n) does not move this hyperplane; (2) if E (x (π)) /∈ H , then
translation by E (x (π)) takes H into an affine hyperplane H˜ of Rm! |H0 that does not go through the origin,
and then scaling by
√
n moves H˜ to an affine hyperplane of Rm! |H0 whose L2 distance from the origin is
proportional to
√
n, so in the n→∞ limit this affine hyperplane “vanishes”.
Definition 8 (Blowup of boundary). For α > 0, we define the blowup of the boundary B˜ by α to be
B˜+α =
{
y˜ ∈ Rm! |H0 : ∃x˜ ∈ B˜ such that ‖x˜− y˜‖1 ≤ α
}
.
Let us focus specifically on a coalition of size c
√
n for some (small) constant c. Corollary 3.4 implies the
following.
Corollary 3.7. For hyperplane rules the limit of the probability that in an election with n voters some
coalition of size c
√
n can change the outcome of the election is µ
(
X˜ ∈ B˜+2c
)
.
The following claim, together with Corollary 3.7, tells us that for hyperplane rules a coalition of size c
√
n
can change the outcome of the election with only small probability, given that c is sufficiently small, proving
Part 2 of Theorem 1.2.
Claim 3.8. Suppose our SCF is a hyperplane rule, and in particular let
{
H˜i
}M
i=1
be a collection of hyper-
planes in Rm! |H0 such that B˜ ⊆
⋃M
i=1 H˜i. Then
µ
(
X˜ ∈ B˜+c
)
≤
√
2
π
Mc√
δ
.
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Proof. By our condition and a union bound we have
µ
(
X˜ ∈ B˜+c
)
≤
M∑
i=1
µ
(
X˜ ∈ H˜+ci
)
.
For a hyperplane H˜ in Rm! |H0 , denote (one of) the corresponding unit normal vector(s) (in the hyperplane
H0) by u. Then
H˜ =
{
x˜ ∈ Rm! |H0 : u · x˜ = 0
}
and since L1 distance is always greater than L2 distance, we have
H˜+c ⊆
{
x˜ ∈ Rm! |H0 : ∃y˜ ∈ H˜ such that ‖x˜− y˜‖2 ≤ c
}
=
{
x˜ ∈ Rm! |H0 : |u · x˜| ≤ c
}
.
Since X˜ is a multidimensional Gaussian r.v., u · X˜ is a one-dimensional Gaussian r.v. (which is centered).
Therefore
µ
(
X˜ ∈ H˜+c
)
≤ µ
(
u · X˜ ∈ [−c, c]
)
≤ 2c√
2πVar
(
u · X˜
) .
We have that
Var
(
u · X˜
)
= E
(
u · X˜
)2
= E
(
uT X˜X˜Tu
)
= uTΣu,
and so all that remains to show is that
min
u:‖u‖=1,u⊥1
uTΣu ≥ δ,
where 1 is the m!-dimensional vector having 1 in every coordinate.
Let λ1 (Σ) ≥ λ2 (Σ) ≥ · · · ≥ λm! (Σ) denote the eigenvalues of Σ. Since Σ is positive semidefinite, all
eigenvalues are nonnegative. We know that 0 is an eigenvalue of Σ (the corresponding eigenvector is 1), so
λm! (Σ) = 0. By the variational characterization of eigenvalues we have
min
u:‖u‖=1,u⊥1
uTΣu = λm!−1 (Σ) ,
and so we need to show that λm!−1 (Σ) ≥ δ. To do this we use Weyl’s inequalities.
Lemma 3.9 (Weyl’s inequalities). For an n× n matrix M let λ1 (M) ≥ λ2 (M) ≥ · · · ≥ λn (M) denote its
eigenvalues. If A and C are n× n symmetric matrices then
λj (A+ C) ≤ λi (A) + λj−i+1 (C) if i ≤ j,
λj (A+ C) ≥ λi (A) + λj−i+n (C) if i ≥ j.
We use Weyl’s inequality for A = diag (p) and C = −ppT . The eigenvalues of A are {p (π)}π∈Sm , all of
which are no less than δ. Since C has rank 1, all its eigenvalues but one are zero, and the single nonzero
eigenvalue is λm! (C) = −pTp. Since Σ = diag (p)− ppT = A+ C, Weyl’s inequality tells us that
λm!−1 (Σ) ≥ λm! (diag (p)) + λm!−1
(−ppT ) ≥ δ + 0 = δ.
This implies that we have a lower bound of Ω (
√
n) for the size of the coalition needed in order to change
the outcome of the election for hyperplane rules. As mentioned before, most commonly occurring SCFs are
in this class of rules: see Appendix B for many examples.
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3.2.1 “Almost” hyperplane rules
Furthermore, the Gaussian limiting setting above is not sensitive to small changes to the voting rule for
finite n. Consequently, for SCFs that are “almost” hyperplane rules (in a sense we make precise below),
the same conclusion holds: a coalition of size Ω (
√
n) is needed in order to be able to change the outcome
of the election with non-negligible probability. In particular, the same result holds for SCFs with arbitrary
tie-breaking rules for ranking profiles which lie on one of the hyperplanes (e.g., the tie-breaking rule can
depend on the number of voters n).
Definition 9 (“Almost” hyperplane rules). Fix a finite set of affine hyperplanes of the simplex ∆m!:
H1, . . . , Hℓ. These partition the simplex into finitely many regions. Let F : ∆
m! → [m] be a function
which is constant on each such region, and let B denote the induced boundary. Then the sequence of SCFs
{fn}n≥1, fn : Snm → [m], is called an “almost” hyperplane rule if for every σn such that x (σn) /∈ B+o(1/
√
n),
we have
fn (σ
n) = F (x (σn)) .
This SCF is called an “almost” hyperplane rule induced by the affine hyperplanes H1, . . . , Hℓ and the func-
tion F .
Lemma 3.10. Suppose the sequence of SCFs {fn}n≥1, fn : Snm → [m], is an “almost” hyperplane rule
defined by ℓ hyperplanes. Then in the Gaussian limiting setting the boundary B˜ is contained in the union of
ℓ˜ hyperplanes of Rm! |H0 , where ℓ˜ ≤ ℓ.
Proof. For finite n, the induced boundary of fn in the simplex ∆
m! is contained in B+o(1/
√
n), by definition.
Since in the Gaussian limit we scale by
√
n, the blowup by o (1/
√
n) of the boundary B disappears in the limit,
and hence we are back to the situation of Lemma 3.6. Consequently, the affine hyperplanes corresponding
to our “almost” hyperplane rule either “disappear to infinity” or become hyperplanes of Rm! |H0 .
Corollary 3.11. Corollary 3.7 and Claim 3.8 hold for “almost” hyperplane rules as well.
3.3 Smoothness of the phase transition
In this final subsection our goal is to show Parts 1 and 3 of Theorem 1.2. The existence of the limits in
Part 1 follows immediately from the Gaussian limit described above; we do not detail this, but rather give
formulas for these limiting probabilities. These then imply the properties described in Part 3 of the theorem.
In the following let the hyperplane rule be given by affine hyperplanesH1, . . . , Hℓ of ∆
m! and the function
F : ∆m! → [m]; in the limiting setting denote by H˜1, . . . , H˜ℓ˜ the corresponding hyperplanes of Rm! |H0 and
denote by F˜ : Rm! |H0 → [m] the corresponding function.
3.3.1 The quantities q and q
For x˜ ∈ Rm! |H0 define
α (x˜) := inf
y˜:F˜ (y˜) 6=F˜ (x˜)
d1 (x˜, y˜) , β (x˜) := max
a∈[m]
inf
y˜:F˜ (y˜)=a
d1 (x˜, y˜) .
From the previous subsection it is then immediate that we can write
q (c) = µ
(
X˜ : α
(
X˜
)
≤ 2c
)
,
q (c) = µ
(
X˜ : β
(
X˜
)
≤ 2c
)
.
It is important to note that the boundary B˜ is contained in the union of finitely many hyperplanes,
H˜1, . . . , H˜ℓ˜, and thus the regions where F˜ is constant are convex cones which are the intersection of finitely
many halfspaces. Consequently α (x˜) is either d1 (x˜, 0), where 0 denotes the origin of R
m!, or it is d1
(
x˜, H˜j
)
for some 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ˜, where d1
(
x˜, H˜j
)
= inf y˜∈H˜j d1 (x˜, y˜). If we scale x˜ by some positive constant λ,
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then the distance from the origin and from every hyperplane scales as well (i.e., d1 (λx˜, 0) = λd1 (x˜, 0) and
d1
(
λx˜, H˜j
)
= λd1
(
x˜, H˜j
)
), and thus for every λ > 0, we have α (λx˜) = λα (x˜). Consequently, if we write
x˜ = ‖x˜‖2 s˜, where s˜ ∈ Sm!−1, and Sm!−1 denotes the (m!− 1)-sphere (not to be confused with Snm, the set
of ranking profiles on n voters and m candidates), then we have α (x˜) = ‖x˜‖2 α (s˜).
The same scaling property holds for β as well, and hence we have
q (c) = µ
(
X˜ :
∥∥∥X˜∥∥∥
2
α
(
S˜
)
≤ 2c
)
,(3)
q (c) = µ
(
X˜ :
∥∥∥X˜∥∥∥
2
β
(
S˜
)
≤ 2c
)
.(4)
Recall that our condition that for every a ∈ [m], P (f (σ) = a) ≥ ε, implies that for every η > 0 and
for every a ∈ [m] there exists x˜ ∈ Rm! |H0 such that ‖x˜‖2 ≤ η and F˜ (x˜) = a. Consequently for every
x˜ ∈ Rm! |H0 we must have α (x˜) ≤ d1 (x˜, 0) and β (x˜) ≤ d1 (x˜, 0). In particular, for s˜ ∈ Sm!−1 we have
d1 (s˜, 0) ≤
√
m!d2 (s˜, 0) =
√
m! and so α (s˜) , β (s˜) ≤ √m!. This immediately implies that for every c > 0 we
have
q (c) ≥ µ
(
X˜ :
∥∥∥X˜∥∥∥
2
≤ 2c√
m!
)
> 0.
To show that q (c) < 1, note that since the boundary is contained in the union of finitely many hy-
perplanes, there exists s˜∗ ∈ Sm!−1 such that α (s˜∗) > 0. By continuity of α, there exists a neighborhood
U ⊆ Sm!−1 of s˜∗ such that for every s˜ ∈ U , α (s˜) ≥ α (s˜∗) /2. For any x˜ such that x˜/ ‖x˜‖2 ∈ U and
‖x˜‖2 > 4cα(s˜∗) , we have
α (x˜) = ‖x˜‖2 α (x˜/ ‖x˜‖2) >
4c
α (s˜∗)
α (s˜∗)
2
= 2c.
So consequently
q (c) ≤ 1− µ
(
X˜ : X˜/
∥∥∥X˜∥∥∥
2
∈ U,
∥∥∥X˜∥∥∥
2
>
4c
α (s˜∗)
)
< 1.
Finally, the fact that q (c) and q (c) are continuously differentiable follows from the formulas (3) and
(4), since q (c) and q (c) are both written as the Gaussian volume of a subset of Rm! |H0 , and in both cases
this subset grows continuously as c increases. The derivative of both q (c) and q (c) is bounded at zero (by
Corollary 3.7 and Claim 3.8), while as c → ∞ the derivative approaches zero, and since the derivative is
continuous, it must be bounded by a constant for the whole half-line.
3.3.2 The quantities r and r
In the previous setup when the coalition of size c
√
n was not specified, the ranking profile could be changed
arbitrarily within a Hamming ball of radius c
√
n. On the probability simplex ∆m! this corresponded to an
L1 ball of radius 2c/
√
n, and in the rescaled limiting setting it corresponded to an L1 ball in Rm! |H0 of
radius 2c. When the coalition of size c
√
n is specified, things are slightly different. In particular, when we
look at the probability distribution on the probability simplex ∆m! induced by the distribution on ranking
profiles (or, in the limiting setting, the Gaussian distribution on Rm! |H0), then we have lost track of the votes
of any specific coalition. Nonetheless, the Gaussian limiting setting still provides formulas for the limiting
probabilities r (c) and r (c).
We can first draw a random ranking profile for the other n − c√n voters not in the coalition, σn−c√n,
and then the voters in the coalition can set their votes arbitrarily. The question is, how can the coalition
affect the outcome of the vote? In particular, (a) can they change the outcome of the election, and (b) can
they elect any candidate?
The ranking profile σn−c
√
n corresponds to a point x
(
σn−c
√
n
)
on the probability simplex ∆m!, and by
setting their votes the coalition can move this point on the probability simplex in some neighborhood of
x
(
σn−c
√
n
)
. We omit the calculation for finite n and only present the result in the limiting setting.
Suppose the limiting ranking profile of the voters other than the coalition corresponds to the point
x˜ ∈ Rm! |H0 . Then the set of points the coalition can reach is the following:
Rc (x˜) :=
{
y˜ ∈ Rm! |H0 : ∀π ∈ Sm : y˜π − x˜π + cp (π) ≥ 0
}
.
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We can then define
ϕ (x˜) := inf
{
γ : ∃y˜ ∈ Rγ (x˜) such that F˜ (y˜) 6= F˜ (x˜)
}
,
ψ (x˜) := inf
{
γ : ∀a ∈ [m]∃y˜ ∈ Rγ (x˜) such that F˜ (y˜) = a
}
,
and it follows immediately that we can then write
r (c) = µ
(
X˜ : ϕ
(
X˜
)
≤ c
)
,
r (c) = µ
(
X˜ : ψ
(
X˜
)
≤ c
)
.
In the same way as in Section 3.3.1 one can argue that ϕ and ψ scale: if λ > 0 then ϕ (λx˜) = λϕ (x˜) and
ψ (λx˜) = λψ (x˜). Hence we have
r (c) = µ
(
X˜ :
∥∥∥X˜∥∥∥
2
ϕ
(
S˜
)
≤ c
)
,(5)
r (c) = µ
(
X˜ :
∥∥∥X˜∥∥∥
2
ψ
(
S˜
)
≤ c
)
.(6)
For every 0 < c <∞ we have r (c) ≤ q (c) < 1 (using Section 3.3.1). Let us now show that also r (c) > 0. We
claim that for all s˜ ∈ Sm!−1|H0 , ψ (s˜) ≤ 2δ . This follows from the fact that if s˜ ∈ Sm!−1|H0 then Sm!−1|H0 ⊆
R 2
δ
(s˜), which is true because if y˜ ∈ Sm!−1|H0 then for all π ∈ Sm, y˜π− s˜π+ 2δ p (π) ≥ −1− 1+ 2δ δ = 0. Thus
we have
r (c) ≥ µ
(
X˜ :
∥∥∥X˜∥∥∥
2
≤ cδ
2
)
> 0
as claimed.
Finally, the fact that r (c) and r (c) are continuously differentiable follows from the formulas (5) and (6)
using an argument given above: r (c) and r (c) are written as the Gaussian volume of subsets of Rm! |H0 ,
and these subsets grow continuously as c increases. The derivative of both r (c) and r (c) is bounded at zero
(by Corollary 3.7 and Claim 3.8), while as c→∞ the derivative approaches zero, and since the derivative is
continuous, it must be bounded by a constant for the whole half-line.
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A Decomposing Rd as the disjoint union of finitely many convex
cones: only via hyperplanes
For self-containment, we reproduce here the main definitions and results of Kemperman [22] that make
precise the claim used in the proof of Lemma 3.1 that the only way to decompose Qd≥0 \ {0} into the disjoint
union of finitely many Q-convex cones is via hyperplanes. Kemperman’s paper deals with convex sets in
general, but here we summarize the results about convex cones that are relevant to us. Kemperman’s results
pertain to finite dimensional linear spaces and we will state them in this form; in the end we show how
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results for Rd≥0 follow immediately from these, and as a consequence we also obtain the claim used in the
proof of Lemma 3.1.
Let us start with the main definitions. In the following, all linear spaces are over the reals and are finite
dimensional. Let X be a linear space. A convex cone is a subset K ⊆ X such that x, y ∈ K and λ > 0 imply
x+ y ∈ K and λx ∈ K. (We do not require that 0 ∈ K.) For a set A ⊆ X , denote its affine hull by aff (A),
its convex hull by cvx (A), and its closure by cl (A). Note that if K ⊆ X is a convex cone, then aff (K) is a
linear subspace of X .
We define two special types of convex cones: basic convex cones and elementary convex cones.
Definition 10 (Basic convex cone). Let K be a convex cone in a finite dimensional linear space X. We say
that K is a basic convex cone (in X) if K is a member K = K0 of some partition
X = K0∪˙K1∪˙ . . . ∪˙Kr
of X into finitely many disjoint convex cones {Ki}ri=0.
Note that any linear subspace Y of X is a basic convex cone, from which it immediately follows that K
is a basic convex cone in X if and only if it is a basic convex cone in aff (K).
In order to define elementary convex cones, we need a few more definitions.
Definition 11 (Open polyhedral convex cone). Let K be a convex cone in a finite dimensional linear space
X. We say that K is an open polyhedral convex cone relative to X if K can be expressed as the intersection
of finitely many open halfspaces H1, . . . , Hℓ of X, each of which has the origin on its boundary. The whole
linear space X is an open polyhedral convex cone with ℓ = 0.
Definition 12 (Relatively open polyhedral convex cone). Let K be a convex cone in a finite dimensional
linear space X. Then K is a relatively open polyhedral convex cone if either K = ∅ or K is an open
polyhedral convex cone relative to aff (K).
Definition 13 (Elementary convex cone). Let K be a convex cone in a finite dimensional linear space X.
We say that K is an elementary convex cone if K can be represented as a disjoint union of finitely many
relatively open polyhedral convex cones.
The main result of Kemperman concerning convex cones is the following [22, Theorem 2].
Theorem A.1. Let K be a convex cone in Rd. Then K is a basic convex cone if and only if it is an
elementary convex cone.
In Lemma 3.1 we only use the “only if” direction, and we thus leave the proof of the “if” direction as an
exercise for the reader.
Proof of “only if” direction. Let X be a finite dimensional linear space and let K be a basic convex cone in
X of dimension d = dim (K) = dim (Y ), where Y = aff (K). We prove by induction on d the following:
(i) The relative interior of K, denoted by K0, is a relatively open polyhedral convex cone.
(ii) If K0 6= Y , then denote by F1, . . . , Fℓ the (d− 1)-dimensional hyperplanes in Y corresponding to the
finitely many faces of the polyhedron cl (K) = cl
(
K0
)
. Then the convex cones Fi ∩K, i = 1, . . . , ℓ, are
elementary convex cones of dimension at most d− 1 (but they need not be disjoint).
(iii) The convex cone K is also an elementary convex cone.
If K = ∅, then properties (i) - (iii) hold. If d = 0, then necessarily K = {0}, since K is a convex cone,
and again K satisfies properties (i) - (iii) above.
So we may assume that d ≥ 1 and that each basic convex cone of dimension at most d − 1 satisfies
properties (i) - (iii) above. Since K is a basic convex cone, there exists a partition
(7) Y = K0∪˙K1∪˙ . . . ∪˙Kr
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of Y into finitely many disjoint convex cones {Kj}rj=0, with K0 = K. We may assume that r ≥ 0 is minimal,
and hence the Kj are non-empty. Note that K
0 is also non-empty since dim (K) = dim (Y ).
If r = 0 then K = K0 = Y and the properties (i) - (iii) above are immediately satisfied, so we may
assume that r ≥ 1. For j = 1, . . . , r, let Hj be a hyperplane in Y which separates the convex cone K = K0
with non-empty interior K0 from the non-empty convex cone Kj. (Such hyperplanes exist by the hyperplane
separation theorem, and, moreover, each such hyperplane goes through the origin, because each Kj contains
at least one point from every open ball around the origin, since each Kj is a cone.) Let H
0
j be the associated
open half space in Y which contains the interior K0 of K. Let
L0 = H01 ∩ · · · ∩H0r .
Then L0 is a polyhedral convex cone, which is open relative to Y , and contains the interior K0 of K.
We claim that L0 = K0. It is enough to show that L0 ⊆ K, because then L0 ⊆ K0 follows from the
definition of K0. Suppose on the contrary that there exists x ∈ L0 such that x /∈ K. Then from the partition
(7) there must exist an index 1 ≤ j ≤ r with x ∈ Kj . This implies that x /∈ H0j and thus x /∈ L0, which is a
contradiction. This proves (i).
Now let us show (ii). By (7), we can write the linear space Fi as the disjoint union of the convex cones
Fi ∩Kj , j = 0, . . . , r, and thus Fi ∩K is a basic convex cone and hence, by induction, an elementary convex
cone.
Finally, let us show that K is an elementary convex cone. Since K0 is a polyhedral convex cone which is
open relative to Y , it only remains to show that K \K0 can be written as a finite disjoint union of relatively
open polyhedral convex cones. By (ii), we can write K \K0 as the finite union of elementary convex cones:
K \K0 = ∪ℓi=1 (Fi ∩K) ,
so what remains is to show that we can write this as a finite disjoint union of relatively open polyhedral
convex cones. We may assume w.l.o.g. that Fi ∩K 6= ∅ for all i and that (Fi ∩K) * (Fj ∩K) for all i 6= j
(otherwise we can leave out Fi ∩K from the union).
We claim that then for every i,
(8) rel int (Fi ∩K) ⊆ (Fi ∩K) \
⋃
j 6=i
(Fj ∩ Fi ∩K) ,
from which it immediately follows that rel int (Fi ∩K) ∩ rel int (Fj ∩K) = ∅ for i 6= j. To show (8), let the
two open halfspaces on either side of the hyperplane Fj be denoted by F
+
j and F
−
j . W.l.o.g. assume that
K ∩ F−j = ∅. Since (Fi ∩K) * (Fj ∩K), we must have (Fi ∩K) ∩ F+j 6= ∅. Let x ∈ (Fi ∩K) ∩ F+j and
let y ∈ Fj ∩ Fi ∩K. Since Fi ∩ K is convex, the interval from x to y is contained in Fi ∩K, but because
(Fi ∩K) ∩ F−j = ∅, no points on this line past the point y can be in Fi ∩K; hence y /∈ rel int (Fi ∩K).
Since Fi ∩ K is a basic convex cone, rel int (Fi ∩K) is a relatively open polyhedral convex cone by
induction. If Fi ∩ K = aff (Fi ∩K) then rel int (Fi ∩K) = Fi ∩ K. If not, then denote by Fi,1, . . . , Fi,ℓi
the hyperplanes in aff (Fi ∩K) corresponding to the finitely many faces of the polyhedron cl (Fi ∩K). By
induction, the convex cones Fi,j ∩ Fi ∩K, j = 1, . . . , ℓi, are elementary convex cones, and we can write
K \K0 =
(
∪˙ℓi=1 rel int (Fi ∩K)
)⋃˙(
∪ℓi=1 ∪ℓij=1 (Fi,j ∩ Fi ∩K)
)
.
What remains to be shown is that ∪ℓi=1 ∪ℓij=1 (Fi,j ∩ Fi ∩K) can be written as a finite disjoint union of
relatively open polyhedral convex cones; this follows by iterating the previous argument.
Let us now show that Rd≥0 is a basic convex cone in R
d. For i = 1, . . . , d, define the closed halfspace
H≥0i =
{
x ∈ Rd : xi ≥ 0
}
and its complement H<0i =
{
x ∈ Rd : xi < 0
}
, and from these define the convex
cones
Ki = H
≥0
1 ∩ · · · ∩H≥0i−1 ∩H<0i , i = 1, . . . , d.
Then we can write Rd as the disjoint union of the convex cones Rd≥0 and K1, . . . ,Kd, showing that indeed
Rd≥0 is a basic convex cone. This implies that if we can write R
d
≥0 as the disjoint union of the convex cones
C1, . . . , Cr, then each Ci is a basic convex cone, and hence, by Theorem A.1, an elementary convex cone.
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Now let us turn to the claim in the proof of Lemma 3.1. In Lemma 3.1, we write Qm!≥0 \ {0} as the disjoint
union of finitely many Q-convex cones: Qm!≥0 \ {0} = C0∪˙C1∪˙ . . . ∪˙Cr. For i = 0, . . . , r, let C˜i = cvx (Ci). It
is known (see, e.g., [40]) that Ci = Q
m! ∩C˜i. The C˜i are therefore disjoint convex cones which satisfy
(9) C˜0∪˙C˜1∪˙ . . . ∪˙C˜r ⊆ Rm!≥0
and
(10) cl
(
C˜0
)
∪ cl
(
C˜1
)
∪ · · · ∪ cl
(
C˜r
)
= Rm!≥0 .
Our goal is to show that each C˜i is an elementary convex cone. Conditions (10) and (9) are very similar to
the definition of a basic convex cone; in this spirit let us introduce the following definition.
Definition 14 (Basic convex cone up to closure). Let K0 be a convex cone in a finite dimensional linear
space X. We say that K0 is a basic convex cone up to closure (in X) if there exist disjoint convex cones
K1, . . . ,Kr such that
K0∪˙K1∪˙ . . . ∪˙Kr ⊆ X
and
cl (K0) ∪ cl (K1) ∪ · · · ∪ cl (Kr) = X.
Since Rd≥0 is a basic convex cone, the C˜i above are basic convex cones up to closure.
In fact, every basic convex cone up to closure is an elementary convex cone; the proof is exactly the same
as the one shown above for the “only if” direction of Theorem A.1, one just needs to replace “basic convex
cone” with “basic convex cone up to closure” everywhere in the proof, and make the appropriate changes.
Moreover, the other direction of Theorem A.1 implies that actually every basic convex cone up to closure is
a basic convex cone.
Hence the C˜i are elementary convex cones, which is what we need in Lemma 3.1.
B Most voting rules are hyperplane rules: examples
In the following we show that all positional scoring rules, instant-runoff voting, Coombs’ method, contingent
vote, the Keme´ny-Young method, Bucklin voting, Nanson’s method, Baldwin’s method, and Copeland’s
method are all hyperplane rules.
• Positional scoring rules. Let w ∈ Rm be a weight vector. Given a ranking profile vector σ, the
(normalized) score of candidate a ∈ [m] is sa = 1n
∑n
i=1 w
(
σ−1i (a)
)
. The positional scoring rule
associated to the weight vector w elects the candidate who has the highest score. (In case of a tie,
there is some tie-breaking rule, but we do not care about this here.) We denote such a SCF on n voters
by fwn . Examples include plurality (with weight vector w = (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0)), Borda count (with weight
vector w = (m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 0)) and veto (with weight vector w = (1, 1, . . . , 1, 0)).
To a sequence of SCFs {fwn }n≥1 we can associate a function Fw : ∆m! → [m] in the following way. For
a candidate a ∈ [m] and x ∈ ∆m!, define the (normalized) score sa (x) =
∑
π∈Sm xπw
(
π−1 (a)
)
, and
let
Fw (x) := argmax
a∈[m]
sa (x) ,
if this argmax is unique, and if it is not unique, then there is some tie-breaking rule. This construction
guarantees that fwn = F
w|Dn . For candidates a 6= b, define
Ha,b :=
{
x ∈ ∆m! : sa (x) = sb (x)
}
,
which is an affine hyperplane of the probability simplex ∆m!. Clearly the boundary Bw is contained
in the union of
(
m
2
)
such affine hyperplanes:
Bw ⊆
⋃
a 6=b∈[m]
Ha,b.
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• Instant-runoff voting. If a candidate receives absolute majority of first preference votes, then that
candidate wins. If no candidate receives an absolute majority, then the candidate with fewest top votes
is eliminated. In the next round the votes are counted again, with each ballot counted as one vote
for the advancing candidate who is ranked highest on that ballot. This is repeated until the winning
candidate receives a majority of the vote against the remaining candidates.
The boundary corresponds to two kinds of situations: either (1) there is a tie at the top at the end,
when only two candidates remain; or (2) there is a tie for eliminating a candidate at the end of one of
the rounds. Technically situation (1) is also contained in situation (2), since at the very end one can
view choosing a winner as eliminating the second placed candidate. One can see that if candidates a
and b are tied for elimination after candidates C ⊆ [m] \ {a, b} (where C = ∅ is allowed) have been
eliminated, then necessarily∑
C′⊆C
∑
{π(1),...,π(|C′|)}=C′,
π(|C′|+1)=a
xπ =
∑
C′⊆C
∑
{π(1),...,π(|C′|)}=C′,
π(|C′|+1)=b
xπ .
Consequently the boundary B is contained in the union of at most m22m affine hyperplanes:
B ⊆
⋃
a 6=b
⋃
C⊆[m]\{a,b}


x ∈ ∆m! :
∑
C′⊆C
∑
{π(1),...,π(|C′|)}=C′,
π(|C′|+1)=a
xπ =
∑
C′⊆C
∑
{π(1),...,π(|C′|)}=C′,
π(|C′|+1)=b
xπ


.
• Coombs’ method. This is similar to IRV, but the elimination rule is different. If a candidate
receives absolute majority of first preference votes, then that candidate wins. If no candidate receives
an absolute majority, then the candidate who is ranked last by the most voters is eliminated. In
the next round the votes are counted again, with each ballot counted as one vote for the advancing
candidate who is ranked highest on that ballot. This is repeated until the winning candidate receives
a majority of the vote against the remaining candidates.
The boundary corresponds to two kinds of situations: either (1) there is a tie at the top at the end,
when only two candidates remain; or (2) there is a tie for eliminating a candidate at the end of one of
the rounds. Technically situation (1) is also contained in situation (2), since at the very end one can
view choosing a winner as eliminating the second placed candidate. One can see that if candidates a
and b are tied for elimination after candidates C ⊆ [m] \ {a, b} (where C = ∅ is allowed) have been
eliminated, then necessarily∑
C′⊆C
∑
{π(m),...,π(m−|C′|+1)}=C′,
π(m−|C′|)=a
xπ =
∑
C′⊆C
∑
{π(m),...,π(m−|C′|+1)}=C′,
π(m−|C′|)=b
xπ.
Consequently the boundary B is contained in the union of at most m22m affine hyperplanes:
B ⊆
⋃
a 6=b
⋃
C⊆[m]\{a,b}


x ∈ ∆m! :
∑
C′⊆C
∑
{pi(m),...,pi(m−|C′|+1)}=C′,
pi(m−|C′|)=a
xpi =
∑
C′⊆C
∑
{pi(m),...,pi(m−|C′|+1)}=C′,
pi(m−|C′|)=b
xpi


.
• Contingent vote. This is also similar to IRV, except here all but two candidates get eliminated
after the first round. If a candidate receives absolute majority of first preference votes, then he/she
wins. If no candidate receives an absolute majority, then all but the top two leading candidates
are eliminated and there is a second count, where the votes of those who supported an eliminated
candidate are redistributed among the two remaining candidates. The candidate who then achieves
absolute majority wins.
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Here the boundary B corresponds to two kinds of situations: either (1) there are two distinct top
candidates, and when the votes of the voters who voted for other candidates are redistributed, then
the two top candidates are in a dead heat; or (2) there are two or more candidates who receive an
equal number of votes in the first round. Both of these situations can be described as subsets of affine
hyperplanes, and so B is contained in the union of at most m (m− 1) affine hyperplanes:
B ⊆
⋃
a 6=b

x ∈ ∆m! :
∑
π:π(1)=a
xπ +
∑
π:π(1)/∈{a,b},api>b
xπ =
∑
π:π(1)=b
xπ +
∑
π:π(1)/∈{a,b},bpi>a
xπ


∪
⋃
a 6=b

x ∈ ∆m! :
∑
π:π(1)=a
xπ =
∑
π:π(1)=b
xπ

 .
• Keme´ny-Young method. Denote by K the Kendall tau distance, which is a metric on permutations
which counts the number of pairwise disagreements between the two permutations, i.e.,
K (τ1, τ2) =
∑
{a,b}
1 [a and b are in the opposite order in τ1 and τ2] ,
where the sum is over all unordered pairs of distinct candidates. Given a ranking profile σn, the
Keme´ny-Young method selects the ranking which minimizes the sum of Kendall tau distances from the
votes:
τ = argmin
n∑
i=1
K (σi, τ) ,
and then the winner of the election is declared to be τ (1). For us it will be convenient to write τ as
τ = argmin
∑
π
xπ (σ
n)K (π, τ) .
Here if we are on the boundary B then there must exist two rankings τ1 and τ2 such that τ1 (1) 6= τ2 (1)
and
∑
π xπK (π, τ1) =
∑
π xπK (π, τ2). Thus B is contained in the union of at most (m!)
2
affine
hyperplanes:
B ⊆
⋃
τ1 6=τ2
{
x ∈ ∆m! :
∑
π
xπK (π, τ1) =
∑
π
xπK (π, τ2)
}
.
• Bucklin voting. First every candidate gets a point from all the voters who ranked them at the top. If
there is a candidate who has a majority (i.e., more than n/2 points), then that candidate wins. If not,
then every candidate gets a point from all the voters who ranked them second. If there is a candidate
who has more than n/2 points after this, then the candidate with the most points wins (there might
be multiple candidates with more than n/2 points after a given round). This process is iterated until
there is a candidate with more than n/2 points.
Here a point on the boundary B corresponds to a situation where some pair of candidates have the
same number of points after some number of rounds. Therefore B is contained in the union of at most
m2 (m− 1) /2 affine hyperplanes:
B ⊆
⋃
a 6=b
m⋃
k=1

x ∈ ∆m! :
k∑
i=1
∑
π:π(i)=a
xπ =
k∑
i=1
∑
π:π(i)=b
xπ

 .
• Nanson’s method. This is Borda count combined with a variation of the instant-runoff voting
procedure. First, the Borda scores of all candidates are computed, and then those candidates with
Borda score no greater than the average Borda score are eliminated. Then the Borda scores of each
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remaining candidate are recomputed, as if the eliminated candidates were not on the ballot. This is
repeated until there is a final candidate left.
The boundary corresponds to situations when a candidate’s Borda score exactly equals the average score
after some candidates have been eliminated. For C ⊆ [m], denote by sa,C (x) the score of candidate
a after exactly the candidates in C have been eliminated (sa,C (x) is a linear function of {xπ}π∈Sm),
and denote by s¯C (x) the average score of remaining candidates after exactly the candidates in C have
been eliminated. The boundary B is contained in the union of at most m2m affine hyperplanes:
B ⊆
⋃
a∈[m]
⋃
C⊆[m]\{a}
{
x ∈ ∆m! : sa,C (x) = s¯C (x)
}
.
• Baldwin’s method. This is essentially Borda count combined with the instant-runoff voting proce-
dure. First, the Borda scores of all candidates are computed, and then the candidate with the lowest
score is eliminated. Then the Borda scores of each remaining candidate are recomputed, as if the
eliminated candidate were not on the ballot. This is repeated until there is a final candidate left.
The boundary corresponds to ties for eliminating a candidate at the end of one of the rounds. Borrow
the notation sa,C (x) from the previous example. The boundary B is thus contained in the union of at
most m22m affine hyperplanes:
B ⊆
⋃
a 6=b
⋃
C⊆[m]\{a,b}
{
x ∈ ∆m! : sa,C (x) = sb,C (x)
}
.
• Copeland’s method. This is a pairwise aggregation method: every candidate gets 1 point for each
other candidate it beats in a pairwise majority election, and 1/2 a point for each candidate it ties with
in a pairwise majority election. The winner is the candidate who receives the most points. This method
corresponds to cutting the simplex ∆m! up into finitely many regions via
(
m
2
)
affine hyperplanes, and
in each region the winner is the candidate with the most points.
While in the previous examples tie-breaking rules were not an issue, here it does become important.
We do not care about tie-breaking rules when we are on an affine hyperplane where two candidates
tie each other in a pairwise majority election. However, there are open regions in the intersection of
halfspaces defined by the affine hyperplanes where candidates are tied at the top with having the same
scores. In this case, in order for Copeland to be a hyperplane rule, we need to break ties in favor of
the same candidate for the whole region. (This is also how Xia and Conitzer break ties for Copeland’s
method in [37].)
Using this tie-breaking rule Copeland’s method is indeed a hyperplane rule, since the boundary is
contained in the union of at most
(
m
2
)
affine hyperplanes:
B ⊆
⋃
a 6=b

x ∈ ∆m! :
∑
π:a
pi
>b
xπ =
∑
π:b
pi
>a
xπ

 .
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